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This paper devises and applies a statistical test for efficient provision of local public education. 
The test is based on the ‘Samuelson condition’ of equality between the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution and marginal cost. The econometric method is a micro-based approach to the 
estimation of the marginal rate of substitution function. This method accounts for possible 
‘Tiebout bias’ caused by the fact that individuals may choose their school districts in accordance 
with their tastes for education. 
1. Introduction 
The question of whether governments spend too much or to little has been 
the subject of much debate but little econometric testing. This paper 
conducts an empirical test of whether local governments spend more or less 
than a Pareto optimal amount on local public goods. Our procedure is very 
simple in principle. We check whether the ‘Samuelson first order conditions’ 
[Samuelson (1954)] for efficient provision of public goods are satisfied. The 
Samuelson conditions require that the sum of individual marginal rates of 
substitution between a public good and the private numeraire equals the 
marginal cost of the public good. This condition is necessary for an interior 
Pareto optimum and in a well-behaved convex economy is also sufficient. 
Theoretical arguments have been made which suggest that the amount of 
local public goods provided may be nearly efficient. Some of these arguments 
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depend on the effectiveness of majority voting. Bowen (1943) proposed a 
model in which the amount spent on public goods is the median of the 
quantities desired by voter-taxpayers, where each voter realizes that in return 
for the benefits of additional public expenditure, he or she will have to bear a 
predetermined share of the extra cost. Bowen showed that if marginal rates 
of substitution are symmetrically distributed and public goods are paid for 
by a uniform ‘head tax’, then majority rule leads to a Pareto efficient supply 
of public goods. Bergstrom (1979) extended the Bowen efficiency theorem to 
include some cases where wealth is not symmetrically distributed and where 
there is a proportional wealth tax. Ledyard (1983) presented a model in 
which voters make rational decisions about whether to vote, candidates 
choose their positions strategically and political equilibrium is efficient. A 
different theoretical case for the efficiency of local public goods supply was 
inspired by the work of Tiebout (1956). Tiebout suggested that the competi- 
tive forces engendered by people ‘voting with their feet’ might lead to 
approximate efftciency. Similarly, Brueckner (1982) argues that community 
maximization of property values leads to efficiency. This line of argument is 
ably summarized and criticized by Bewley (1981) and Stiglitz (1983). 
There is an interesting literature that argues that local public goods are 
undersupplied. Barlow (1970) suggested that the Bowen conditions are 
typically not satisfied and offered evidence that in the case of local school 
expenditures in Michigan, the median quantity demanded is less than the 
Pareto optimal amount. Some economists believe that voters systematically 
underestimate the benefits of public goods. Galbraith (1958) attributed this to 
the effect of private advertising. Downs (1960) argued that because infor- 
mation is costly and a single voter has a negligible effect on public outcomes, 
it is rational for voters to be less than fully informed about the effect of 
public goods. This, Downs argues, leads to a systematic underestimation of 
benefits, which are poorly understood, relative to tax costs which are easily 
understood. Some writers have suggested that local governments supply too 
little public goods because there are ‘spillovers’ in benefits from one city to 
another. These effects were analyzed by Brazer (1961), Weisbrod (1964), and 
Williams (1966). 
Others have made appealing arguments that ‘too much’ is spent. Romer 
and Rosenthal (1978), Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Denzau, MacKay 
and Weaver (1981) argue that bureaucrats may manipulate the choices 
offered to voters in such a way as to lead to greater expenditure than the 
median of the most preferred amounts of voters. Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982) 
found evidence to support the hypothesis of bureaucratic manipulation. 
Stiglitz (1983) argued that renters’ incentives in elections are inconsistent 
with efficiency. Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) suggested that 
public employee market power might also lead to inefficient levels of public 
provision. 
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Our test is designed to detect undersupply of the kind described by Barlow 
or oversupply due to bureaucratic manipulation. Since we deal with con- 
sumers’ reported preferences about expenditures in their own cities, we will 
not be able to detect undersupply or oversupply that occurs because people 
do not know what is good for them. We will also be unable to discover 
whether there is undersupply because of unrewarded spillovers from one city 
to another. Furthermore, our results can tell us nothing about whether 
efftciency would require a different assignment of people to cities. A test of 
the type we suggest can at best only determine whether the existing 
population of a city could make a Pareto improvement for its members by 
increasing or decreasing its public expenditures. 
2. Methodology 
Suppose that we observe a number of communities (school districts in our 
case) each of which supplies a local public good. Consumer i who lives in 
community j has a marginal rate of substitution between the public and 
private goods that is a function of the form: 
WI, = rn(Aj, x, Hi, Zj), (1) 
where Aj is the amount of the public good provided in community j, Yi is i’s 
disposable income (consumption of private goods), Hi is a vector of personal 
characteristics of person i (such as age, sex, family status, etc.) and Zj is a 
vector of characteristics of community j (such as its population, climate, 
proximity to other cities, etc.). 
To make a manageable task of estimating the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution, we will have to make some restrictive assumptions about the 
functional form of m(Aj, Y, Hi,Zj). In particular, we assume that individual 
marginal rate of substitution functions are of the form: 
NAj, ~,Hi,Zj)=p,+B1lnAj+/3,ln Y++Cp,,lnZj, 
k 
+ C PhkHik + EL. 
k 
(2) 
Let Xi denote the column vector (1,ln Aj,ln Y,,ln Zj, Hi) of right-hand 
variables of the MRS equation. Eq. (2) can then be written simply as: 
mi = B’x, + Ei. (3) 
We estimate the marginal rate of substitution function, m( x, Aj, Hi, Z,), for 
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expenditures on public primary and secondary education in Michigan using a 
1978 survey of Michigan households [see Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld 
(1979)]. Once we have estimates of this function, based on this statewide 
sample, we can try to predict the sum of marginal rates of substitution in 
individual school districts. We can then compare this sum with the marginal 
cost of public goods to the school district. If we find that the predicted sum 
of marginal rates of substitution in this school district is greater than our 
estimate of the marginal cost of schooling to the district, it may be that the 
district is spending too little on public goods from the standpoint of 
efficiency. It might also be the school district is different in some way that we 
have not measured from other districts in the state. But if there is a 
systematic tendency to undersupply (oversupply) local public education, then 
when we compare the predicted sums of marginal rates of substitution to 
marginal costs for a large number of school districts we should expect to find 
that the predicted sums of marginal rates of substitution on average tend to 
exceed (fall short of) the estimated marginal costs of public goods. 
From the Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld survey, we can calculate 
respondent i’s tax price, ti. If her home community provided the same 
amount that she would choose given her tax price, then each respondent’s 
tax price would be equal to her marginal rate of substitution, so that mi = ti. 
We could then estimate the parameters of the marginal rate of substitution 
function simply be running a regression in which the dependent variable is 
the tax price, ti. 
While people may tend to move to communities where the provision of 
public goods is in accordance with their tastes, there is no reason to expect 
unanimous agreement within communities about expenditure levels. It is true 
that if people sorted themselves so that residents of the same community had 
nearly identical tastes and incomes, then with an equitable tax structure and 
a reasonably responsive government, we would expect all residents to be 
getting approximately the amount of public goods that they would choose 
for themselves given the tax structure. But there are strong economic forces 
that lead to diversity within communities. People with different occupational 
skills find it advantageous to work together and to live in close proximity. 
The housing stock may be highly variable in age, quality, size of units, and 
attractiveness of location. It is not surprising therefore that within communi- 
ties there is a wide range in the incomes, education levels, ages, and family 
sizes of residents. While taxes of different types of consumers could possibly 
be adjusted to achieve near unanimity about quantities, we cannot expect on 
a priori grounds that communities will be in Lindahl equilibrium. And 
indeed empirically there is no such near-unanimity. In the Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld survey about 25 percent of the respondents wanted 
higher and about 17 percent wanted lower expenditures on public goods 
than were currently supplied in their communities. 
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The fact that community choice is voluntary leads to a potentially 
important statistical problem. This problem of ‘Tiebout bias’ [Goldstein and 
Pauly (1981)] can be described as follows. Define the variable vi to be the 
difference between household i’s marginal rate of substitution and its tax 
price. Thus, we have: 
ti=m(Aj3 y,Hi>Zj)+qi, (4) 
and therefore from (3) it follows that 
ti = /TX, + Ei + vi. (5) 
If yli were uncorrelated with variables Xi, then the mismatch between ti and 
mi would cause no econometric problems. Then if EL is also uncorrelated with 
Xi, unbiased estimators of the parameters of eq. (5) could be found by 
ordinary least squares. (One instance where this would be the case is where 
vi is zero for all i.) We want to take account of the possibility that vi is 
correlated with the right-hand-side variables, Xi. For this reason we will 
have to use a more elaborate econometric method which is described in the 
remainder of this section. 
We focus on a survey question in which respondents were asked whether 
they would prefer school spending to increase, decrease or remain the same, 
if they knew that their taxes would change to reflect these expenditure 
changes. Because the responses take the form of discrete rather than 
continuous variables, we must use a qualitative response model. We postu- 
late that people only say that they are dissatisfied with the current state of 
affairs if their tax price is sufficiently different from their marginal rate of 
substitution. If the difference is not sufficiently large, they respond that they 
want local school expenditures to remain the same (S). If their marginal rate 
of substitution is sufftciently larger than their tax price, they respond that 
they want more expenditures (M) and if it is sufficiently smaller they respond 
that they want less (L). The concept of sufficient difference is formalized by a 
parameter 6 such that the response is (M) if m, > ti+ 6; (L) if mi < ti -6; and 
(S) if ti-_<mi<ti+6. 
Recalling eq. (3) we see that the probabilities of individual i’s responses 
conditional on a tax rate ti and vector of characteristics Xi are: 
P(M,ltiy Xi)=P(&i> ti-~X+6), 
(6) 
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Assuming that E has a standard normal distribution, the probabilities can be 
expressed in terms of the standard normal cumulative distribution as follows: 
P(Milti,Xi)= 1 -F 
( 
ti_p’X + S-E(&lti, Xi) 
~ 
a(Elti, xi) ) ’ 






dElti> xi) > 
ti-p’X-6-E(&lti,Xi) 
a(E(ti, xi) > 
(7) 
If E were distributed independently of (ti,Xi), it would be the case that 
E(.zlti, Xi) =0 and standard, ordered probit estimation would yield consistent 
and eflicient estimators of the parameters /? and 6. But we suspect that this is 
not the case. As we argued in connection with eq. (5), even if we are willing 
to assume that ci is uncorrelated with Xi by itself, the correlation between &i 
and ti conditional on Xi will generally be nonzero. Similarly, since the vector 
Xi includes as one of its components actual school spending levels in i’s 
community (lnAj), the correlation between ci and Xi given ti is likely to be 
nonzero. Failure to recognize these possible correlations can result in what 
we call Tiebout bias, or bias that occurs because people take into account 
their preferences for public goods when they decide where to live. 
To deal with possible correlation between E and (ti,Xi), we introduce a set 
of instrumental variables which plausibly have a negligible influence on the 
marginal rate of substitution functions but which may affect either ti or Aj. 
In the next section we will describe these instrumental variables, which are 
denoted by the vector I+$ Let us define Xi to be the vector obtained by 
dropping the component lnAj from the vector Xi. Our approach is to add 
two equations to the model, which may themselves be simultaneously 
determined. The reduced forms are follows: 
(8) 
(9) 
where o1 and o2 are random errors assumed to be uncorrelated with W and 
r?. We estimate the system of eqs. (7)<9), using the method of full 
information maximum likelihood. The relevant likelihood function is des- 
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cribed in the appendix. A detailed discussion of the approach can be found 
in Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987). 
3. Predicting individual marginal rates of substitution 
Our source of data is a sample of 1093 Michigan homeowners from a 
survey of Michigan voters residing in many different school districts. The fact 
that the sample includes voters from different school districts is important 
since we want to estimate the effects of characteristics of the school districts 
in which a respondent lives as well as the respondent’s own characteristics on 
her willingness to pay for an additional unit of local public education. The 
individual characteristics of the respondents were recorded in the survey. The 
characteristics of the school systems were obtained from the Michigan 
Department of Education, while other community characteristics were taken 
from the 1970 U.S. Census First Count and Fourth Count School District 
data tapes. The definitions of all variables used in the estimation procedure 
are given in table 1. 
3. I. Measurement of independent variables for the prediction equations 
The way in which we measure quantity and price variables requires some 
























Definition of variables. 
~~ 
Individual’s tax price 
Log of actual per pupil educational expenditure 
Log of household disposable income 
Dummy variables: I if black 0 otherwise 
Number of children younger than six years old 
Number of children between 6 and 11 
Dummy variable: 1 if child in private school 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if a college graduate 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if did not graduate from high school 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if female 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if retired or disabled 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if age over 65 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if unemployed 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if transfer payments received 0 otherwise 
Log of total school district enrollment 
Log of number of students per school 
Log of county average teachers salary 
Log of county average income 
Log of county average wage rate 
Fraction of households with income within 30 percent of median (YDIST is 
thought of as a measure of population homogeneity) 
Dummy variable: 1 if in central city 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable: 1 if in SMSA 0 otherwise 
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iences is measured by per student expenditures in the local school district. 
Per student expenditures by itself is the appropriate measure if there are 
constant returns to scale in the production of local education and if the costs 
of educational inputs are the same across districts. To allow for the 
possibility that there may be increasing or decreasing returns to scale, we 
included variables for total enrollment in the school district and average 
enrollment per school in the district. If there are increasing (decreasing) 
returns to scale, then providing an extra unit of education would be cheaper 
(more expensive) in larger school districts. 
To allow for differences in costs due to differences in the wages paid to 
teachers, we included a variable measuring the average teachers’ salary in the 
county where the school district was located. We used the average teachers’ 
salary for the county in which the school district was located rather than the 
average teachers’ salary in the district itself since differences in the latter 
might be strongly influenced by differences in the quality and experience of 
teachers while differences in the former might more closely reflect the market 
conditions facing the school district. Not only might the prices of school 
inputs differ from district to district, but so might the price of private goods. 
The average wage rate of nonteachers is used as a surrogate for a local price 
index for private goods.’ We also included as a variable the mean per 
capita income in the respondents’ home county. 
Since the commodity of interest is per student school expenditures, the tax 
price ti paid by family i is the cost to i of increasing the expenditure per 
student in the school district where the family resides by one dollar. In the 
survey, each respondent reported the assessed value of his home. The tax 
share of respondent i was taken as the ratio of the assessed value of i’s home 
to the total assessed value of property in is home district. This tax share 
multiplied by the number of students in the district is the tax price, ti. 
We do not know much about the tax shares perceived by renters. 
Therefore we did not estimate separate marginal rate of substitution 
functions for renters. Instead, we assumed that renter preferences for public 
goods were the same as the preferences of homeowners (though of course 
their tax prices might be very different). When we later construct estimates of 
sums of marginal rates of substitution in the community, we must add in the 
estimated sum over renters as well as homeowners. 
The respondent’s disposable income was recorded from the survey. We 
included several other variables that describe individual characteristics which 
might influence demand. One variable of interest is whether a respondent has 
children in the local public schools. We included separate dummy variables 
for whether a respondent had children of school age and for whether a 
‘Differences in wages due simply to the occupational mix are excluded since we were able to 
find wages by occupation and compute a weighted average using the same weights for each 
occupation across communities. 
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respondent had preschool children. We also include a variable for whether 
the respondent has children in private school. Other variables describe the 
respondent’s race, sex, educational level, and whether the respondent is over 
65 years of age, retired, unemployed, or receiving welfare payments. 
We use four instrumental variables which could reasonably be expected to 
influence a taxpayer’s actual tax price or the local school district’s expendi- 
ture level but would not have a direct effect on willingnesses to pay for local 
public education. The first is the fraction of households in i’s community 
with income within 30 percent of the community median income. The more 
homogeneous a population, the more agreement there should be about the 
correct level of spending. Furthermore, a person in a homogeneous commun- 
ity is not as likely as one in a heterogeneous community to have extremely 
high or low tax shares, since property values are likely to be more nearly 
equal. The second instrument is the percent change in educational expendi- 
tures between the fiscal year 1977-78 and 1978-79. Because moving is costly, 
households will often choose to remain in a community even though local 
spending changes at a different rate than household demand. 
The third and fourth instruments are intended to measure the ease of 
‘voting with one’s feet’. In urban areas there are many school districts within 
commuting distance of one’s job. In an isolated community or a rural area 
there will typically be only one school district. If the workplace requires 
diversity of tastes and income, one would expect more sorting into communi- 
ties of relatively homogeneous tastes and income in the suburbs than in 
isolated communities. We therefore include a dummy variable for whether a 
respondent resides in a central city and another dummy for whether the 
individual resides in an SMSA. 
3.2. The prediction equations for individuals 
We write the equation for predicting the marginal rate of substitution of 
individual i as: 
hi = PXi + ~i(ti, Xi, I$$), (10) 
where ~i(ti, Xi, w) is the estimated value of si conditional on ti, Xi and I+$. As 
we show in the appendix, the expected value of the error term can be written: 
E(EiJti,Xi, lJ$)=Ytti+y:Xi+Y~K$. (11) 
Our estimating procedure provides us with unbiased estimators of the y’s so 
that 
~i(ti, Xi, ~) =3rti + ~:Xi + ~~ ~. (12) 
J.P.E. B 
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Eq. (10) is therefore equivalent to 
Cr, = j*ti +(B’ + jj:.xi + y:kl$ (13) 
The full information maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of 
eq. (13) are given in table 2. Estimates of /I are in column 1 and estimates of 
y are in column 2. 
While the primary purpose of this effort is to provide prediction equations 
to be used for other purposes, it is of interest to notice the magnitudes of 
price and income elasticities that are implicit in the parameter estimates that 
we use. With convex preferences, we should expect the marginal rate of 
substitution between education and other goods to vary inversely with the 
amount of public education and directly with disposable income (since the 
latter measures expenditures on ‘other goods’). As can be seen from table 2, 
the estimated effect of household income on marginal rate of substitution 
was significantly positive and the estimated effect of expenditure on marginal 
Table 2 
























































































































-Log likelihood: 727.47. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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rate of substitution was significantly negative. The implied income elasticity 
of demand based on these estimates is 0.23. The implied price elasticity of 
demand is -0.87.2 
The reader is free to explore and interpret other coefficients that appear in 
the table. The estimates of yt and yA (where yA is the element in the vector yx 
that is associated with In A) tell us about the correlation between E and (t,X), 
which is to say, the importance of Tiebout sorting. As we demonstrate in the 
appendix, if there were no correlation between E and (t,X), then yt and yA 
would both be zero. We find, using asymptotic r-tests, that yt (but not yA) is 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
In table 3 we present the maximum likelihood estimates of the marginal 
rate of substitution function where no correction for Tiebout sorting is made. 
These estimates constrain E to be uncorrelated with or and ox, the 
unobserved determinants of tax price and actual expenditures (that is, yt and 
yA are constrained to zero). Almost all the coefficients of the constrained 
model are substantially larger than those of the general model. The 
Table 3 





























- 1.686 1.189 
0.863 0.713 
- 1.027 0.752 
0.754 0.571 
- 2.863 1.632 
0.885 0.981 
-2.139 1.714 












-Log likelihood: 731.51. 
2These estimates are obtained by solving the equation m = 8, In A +p2 In Y + constants for In A 
as a function of the other variables. When a consumer is getting the desired amount of public 
goods, m is equal to the price p that he pays for them. Then we have In A = 
(p -p2 In Y + constants)/B, The income elasticity is therefore just - bJ/Ir and the price elasticity 
evaluated at the mean price is just p/p,. Using our estimates PI and B2, we find 0.23 and -0.87, 
respectively. 
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likelihood ratio test between the constrained and unconstrained models 
yields a chi-square (2 d.f.) of 8.10. As a result, the hypothesis of zero 
covariance, or the exogeneity of both expenditures and tax price, can be 
rejected at the 1 percent level. 
4. Testing for efficiency of community expenditures 
4.1. Predicting community sums of marginal rates of substitution 
Now that we have prediction equations for individual marginal rates of 
substitution, we can use these equations, together with information available 
from the Census about the distributions of economic and demographic 
characteristics in school districts, to predict the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution in any school district in Michigan. The way we proceed is as 
follows. Let Sj be the set of households in community j and let mj=xipsjmi. 
Since eq. (13) in linear in t, X, and W we can estimate the sum of marginal 
rates of substitution as follows: 
&jit’= C rizi=P,tj+(8’+9:)Xj+.31YWj, (14) 
ieS, 
where tj=cissj ti, Xj=CiESjXi, and Wj=xieSj J4(. 
If we sum the expression in eq. (3) over all consumers in community j, we 
have: 
iSSj 
where E’= cissj ci. From adding the expressions in eq. (1 l), it follows that: 
qe’J tj, xj, wj) = yt tj + y:Xj + yl, Wj. (16) 
From eqs. (14), (15), and (16) it follows that: 
+ q&y, x’, Wj). (17) 
For each community, we must find the aggregate vectors, Xj and WI. 
Most of the components of these vectors are aggregates that are readily 
available in statistics published by the U.S. Census or the Michigan 
Department of Education. For example, the Census records the number of 
households in each commmunity, the number of persons over 65 years of 
age, and the number of persons with a college education. 
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Calculating the sum of In Y in each community is slightly more difficult. 
Here the problem is twofold: the Census reports information on income 
rather than log of income, and the form of the information differs between 
families and unrelated individuals. The approach we have taken is to 
estimate the mean of In Y for families from the information available on 
family income and the mean of In Y for individuals from the information on 
individual income. Weighting these by the number of families and the 
number of unrelated individuals, respectively, we obtain the district-wide 
mean of In Y. The distribution of families in a school district was given for 
fifteen income brackets, allowing us to estimate the median family income 
(we assume a uniform distribution within each bracket). Then assuming 
income is distributed log-normally, we have, for families: 
mean (In Y) = median (In Y) = In median (Y). 
For unrelated individuals, the only data available were aggregate income and 
the number of individuals. For them we took lnmean (Y) as an approxima- 
tion for mean (In Y). 
4.2. Efficiency in the interest of society as a whole 
Let cj be the marginal cost of providing the local public good to 
community j. Then the Samuelson efficiency condition for community j is 
expressed by the equation: 
cj=mi=iz m,=/l’Xj+G. (18) 
J 
In our application the public good is per student expenditures in the local 
public schools. The cost to a school district of increasing expenditures per 
student by one dollar is equal to the number of students in the district. 
Therefore cj is just the number of students enrolled in school district j. If the 
only benefits from local schools accrue to people living in the school district, 
and if district j spends the efficient amount, then we should have mj/cj= 1. 
For the 497 Michigan school districts, the average ratio of fij to cj is 0.748. 
The distribution of the computed values of the ratio of community MRS to 
marginal cost is shown in fig. 1. More than 80 percent of the school districts 
have tij/cj < 1. 
It is possible to use our estimates to identify school districts for which 
there is an especially large divergence between the sum of marginal rates of 
substitution and marginal cost. But it is important to remember that for a 
particular community, such a divergence is not necessarily an indication of 
inefficiency. It might be that unobserved differences in tastes for education or 
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Fig. 1. Community marginal rates of substitution. 
unobserved cost differences account for the discrepancy. In our notation, this 
would mean that tzj differs from its expected value. 
Although ~j-E(.@,Xj, Wj) will vary across individual districts, we can 
expect that the average value of this difference over the 497 school districts 
in Michigan will be very close to zero. To test for a systematic tendency for 
overspending or underspending in Michigan, we therefore want to study the 
average over all Michigan school districts of the ratio Aj/cj. Under the null 
hypothesis that there is no systematic bias toward overspending or under- 
spending, we would have (l/n)xj”, 1 (m’/cj) = 1. From eq. (17) it follows that: 





Ei - E( E’ 19, x’, Iv’) 
J cj 
The variance of the expression in eq. (19) comes from two sources. One 
T.C. Bergstrom et al., Supply of public education 303 
source is the variance of the @s and f’s around the ‘true’ /3’s and y’s, The 
second source of variance is the random variable E. Since .C is a mean of 
statistically independent community specific random variables taken from 
497 communities, the latter source of variance can reasonably be neglected. 
As we see from eq. (19) the difference (l/n)x;, 1 (riij/cj)- 1 is a linear 
combination of the difference between our parameter estimates for the p’s 
and 7’s and their expected value. Since we have estimates of the variance- 
covariance matrix for these estimates, we can readily calculate an estimate of 
the standard deviation of the expression in eq. (19). According to our 
computations, the random variable (l/n)xj”, 1 (Ijlj/cj) takes the value 0.748 
and the estimated standard error of this random variable is 0.09. Therefore 
we must reject the hypothesis of efficiency at the 5 percent significance level. 
These results suggest that the sum of marginal rates of substitution 
between local public education and other goods in Michigan communities 
tends to be less than the marginal cost of public goods. If the only 
beneficiaries of local public education are the residents of the community in 
which the education is provided, this would mean that most communities 
spend too much on local public education from the standpoint of social 
efficiency. 
4.3. Efficiency in the interest of the localities 
There is another way in which the efficiency of local governments could be 
measured. Instead of comparing the sum of marginal rates of substitution 
with the marginal cost of local public education, we might compare this sum 
with the fraction of marginal costs that are borne by the voters in the school 
district. This would give us a test of whether school districts are acting 
efficiently in the interest of their own residents. 
In Michigan, at the time of this survey, marginal increments to local 
revenue came from the local property tax. In most school districts a large 
fraction of the property tax base is nonresidential property and, of course, 
much of this property is either not locally owned or concentrated in the 
hands of a very small number of voters. (For the included communities 
nonresidential property is 35 percent of the property tax base.) If people 
believe that taxes assessed on nonresidential property are fully exported and 
if the fraction of the local property tax base that is residential property is sj, 
then efficiency from a purely local point of view requires that mj/cj=sj. 
For 454 of the 497 communities that we observed, &/cj-sj is positive and 
for the remaining communities &/cj-sj is negative. Under the null hypo- 
thesis that, on average, mj/cj=sj. eq. (19) would be replaced by: 
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where S=( l/n)x;, 1 d. 
As it turns out S=O.649 and (l/n)~jn,i (ritj/cj) =0.748. The estimated 
standard error of the random variable (l/n)xj”= I (@/cj)-S is 0.09. Therefore 
we are not able to reject the hypothesis that, on average, mj/cj = sj. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This is, as far as we know, the first attempt in the literature to empirically 
test the Samuelson conditions for efficient provision of public goods. 
Accordingly, we urge the reader to interpret our results cautiously. Other 
data sources and other methods of approach may lead to very different 
conclusions. To illustrate this point, we must point out that our corrections 
for Tiebout bias had a very strong effect on our results. If we estimate the 
marginal rate of substitution functions, making no correction for Tiebout 
bias, but otherwise pursuing the same methods, we find that the average 
value of the ratio of summed marginal rates of substitution to marginal cost 
in Michigan school districts is 1.62, while with the correction, the average 
value is 0.748. Thus, the uncorrected estimates would suggest substantial 
underspending and the corrected estimates suggest a tendency toward 
overspending. 
The choice of which variables to treat as endogenous also makes a 
difference, albeit a smaller difference, to the efficiency calculation. When the 
endogeneity correction is applied only to expenditures, and not to price, the 
average ratio of summed MRS to marginal cost is about 0.94. However, 
when the endogeneity correction is applied to tax price alone, the resulting 
efficiency calculation is 0.80, much closer to the result of applying the 
endogeneity correction to both variables. 
These facts suggest that if someone wants to prove either that too much or 
too little is being spent, he can find the desired result by fiddling with the 
specification of the model. We think that the correction we have chosen is 
preferable on theoretical grounds to the uncorrected estimates. Other data 
sets and other choices of instrumental variables may lead to different 
conclusions. But if there is a strong tendency in one direction or another, we 
expect that it would be confirmed in repeated studies. We hope that others 
will try to investigate this question empirically. 
With these qualifications in mind, suppose we take our empirical results as 
roughly correct, what conclusions could we draw? On average it appears that 
the sum of marginal rates of substitution for local public education is lower 
than marginal cost. If there are no spillovers of benefits from one school 
district to others, this would mean that local school districts are overspend- 
ing from the standpoint of social efficiency. But, on average, the sum of the 
residents’ marginal rates of substitution is about equal to the share of the 
costs that are borne by local taxpayers. This means that local school districts 
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tend to act quite efficiently in promoting the interests of the voting 
population which does not bear the entire cost of local education. Whether 
this is a socially efficient arrangement depends on the size of the externalities 
generated by local education for the rest of the economy. 
So, even if our empirical results were unquestioned, we would not have 
ended the debate on whether too much or too little is being spent. Whether 
or not the expenditure level is efficient from the viewpoint of society as a 
whole it would be of considerable interest of our conclusion that local school 
districts tend to act efficiently in the interests of local voters is corroborated 
by other research. 
Appendix 
The system of eqs. (3), (8) and (9), in the text is assumed to have a vector 
of random disturbances (E,co~, WJ with a joint normal distribution with 
mean zero and with off-diagonal covariances that are not necessarily zero. It 
is the fact that these off-diagonal terms, CJ_, c_, and o,,,, are nonzero that 
causes Tiebout bias to be a problem. 
A full information maximum likelihood procedure is used to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates. Letting R represent an individual’s more/ 
same/less response, the likelihood function that is maximized represents the 
joint probability of observing the given set of (R, t,ln A) vectors. For 
example, given X, and We, the likelihood of observing a ‘more’ response, tax 
price t,, and expenditure level, A0 is: 
pr(more, t,, In A,) = i f(s, ~~o,~zo) ds, 
(10 + 6 -B’Xo)/o, 
where o,o=to-~B,,rfo-0,2W0 and ~zo=lnAo-~,,~o-8,,Wo. Using 
Bayes’ law, 
f(G ml9 02) = St&J ol,w*)f(W1,W2)=f(&JOltWZ)f(01102)f(02). 
And, from standard results for conditional distributions of multivariate 
normal variables, E(EIw~~, wZo) = Il,olo +&CO,, and E(w, Io+~) = l,oZo, 
where 
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Then the term in the likelihood function corresponding 
is: 
to this observation 
(%O - A2W2d2 &I ___- 
2d,,o2 20;; 
In a similar fashion, the likelihood function for the entire sample becomes: 
+ 1 In F (( ti_P'Xi+6-%,w,i-%202i itSame gEIW1.102 
Substituting w,i=ti_0l,r?i_0t),2& and wzi=lnAi-H,,r?i-0,2&, we 
maximize this function with respect to /?, 6, 0, iI, A2, &, ~~~~~~~~~ and 
0 WI 102. 
We are concerned here, however, with predicting marginal rates of 
substitution, rather than with estimates of the structural model. That is, we 
are concerned with 
Gathering terms and making obvious substitutions, we can write: 
These are the reduced form parameter estimates fi and y that are reported in 
table 2. Notice that yr=A1 and yA=A2. We found 8=0.128 (0.129), I,= 
-0.026 (0.009), and cw2 =0.429 (0.005). 
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